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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BUILDING SYSTEMS,
and KERRY R. HUBBLE,

1'i"!JFH'lE:3:3

F.,

CASE NO. 19009

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v5.
'HARLES H. CHAP'\AN and EDYTHE

S. CHAPMAN,

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
The
Verdict

granted

1efendants.

contractor,

in

this

against

matter

is

plaintiffs

from a Directed
and

in

favor

of

The Directed Verdict is premised on the Court's

determination,

of law.

Appeal

that whether

the plaintiffs were a general

i.e. a licensed contractor or not, was a matter

Further,

the Court determined that they were not

entitled to recover.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendants-Respondents

respectfully request that

j11dgment of the Trial Court be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Plaintiffs-Appellants,
to as

"Plaintiffs",

in part,

hereinafter refer.;·

in their Statement of Facts, set fort':.

the applicable and pertinent facts.

statements

"1any of tre

in that section of plaintiffs' Brief on Appea.

are not supported by the record and are merely gratuitous.
Accordingly,

it

is necessary to state the appropriate an1

relevent facts with

references to the available record anJ

address statements of fact

asserted by the plaintiff that

are outside the record.
The Respondent-Defendant,
to

as

Force

hereinafter

"Defendant", Charles H.

Chapman,

enlisted

any building construction

experience.
referred

man,

without

is

a

referreo

retired Air

The other Respondent-Defendant,

to

housewife and

as

"Defendant",

nurse,

Edythe

s.

hereinafter

Chapman,

is a

who has no other connection with this

matter other than a co-owner of the

property upon which

the cabin was constructed.
The plaintiff, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.
registered corporation,
"d/b/a",
of

Utah;

let alone authorized
nor

is

it

a

nor

is

it

a

registerd

to do business in the State

licensed

contractor,

licensP1'

construct cabins or any structures

in

(R-051)

Its co-plaintiff wh·J

of

the Court documents).

-2-

the State of

Ucjl·.

0
·•

r,unself

pr_,-

,,-,

the

i'lS

Kerr}

R.

President of

Hubble,

that nonexistent

and was not, at the time of

-,,, •_,.,,;t, construction, nor trial, a licensed contractor
Jur, or any other state
The
,,,;trigr.t
,

log

defendant,

Charles

H.

Chapman,

purchased

from plaintiff, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.,

kit

which

consisted of

J'Jtside shell of
This

3 -P) •

(R-052).

a

log

purchase

cabin
is

the

logs

to construct the

in May of

not

1981

(See Exhibit

contested and was not the

subject matter of this lawsuit.
Later,

the

defendant,

negotiated with plaintiff and
to purchase
:abin
same

in

the

the
and

the

Exhibit

H.

Chapman,

reached a signed agreement

the additional materials needed to erect the

Summit County

time,

Charles

parties orally agreed

At the

to have plaintiff

cabin utilizing the previously purchased log

additional
4-P for

a3reement was

(See Trial Exhibit 4-P)

log home framing

package as shown

the sum of $2,500.00.

reduced to writing,

When the oral

the erection cost was

unilaterally changed by plaintiffs to $3,850.00, which was
$1,350.00 more than
Exhibits

5-P

and

the original price of $2,500.00

17-P)

The

the Respondent,

change

in

price

(See

is what

Charles H. Chapman from signing

Other than the change in price, the document
1°Llects

the

intent

of

the

.lil1erness Building Systems,

-3-

parties
Inc.,

that

plaintiff,

as contractor,

build

the cabin.
The Respondent,
inexperienced

Charles H. Chapman,

'lS

'l

tcil''
aco:3 u"'-

individual in construction, hired

licensed contractor, Appellant, Wilderness Building
Inc.

and Kerry R. Hubble,

to act as the general contractor,

to properly construct his cabin as
permit

(See Exhibit 28-D).
The

cabin

was

architectural drawings
(See

shown by the building

Exhibits

9-P,

to

H.

Chapman,

10-P,

11-P,

and 12-P)

that

the

specified
and

that

requested

During the

and

purchase1

the construction

not consistent with the architectural drawings,

nor the sketches furnished by plaintiffs
At

based upon

it became apparent to Respondent,

materials were not being used,
itself was

constructed,

and sketches provided by plaintiffs

progress of construction,
Charles

be

that
that

time,

defendant,

(See Exhibit 17-P).

Charles H.

Chapman,

plaintiffs cease and disist any further

construction on the cabin

(See Exhibit 18-P).

Further,

defendant, Charles H. Chapman, contacted the State of Utah,
Department of Business Regulations, Division of Contnctors,
to lodge a Complaint against plaintiffs, Wilderness Building
Systems,

Inc. and/or Kerry R. Hubble.

that defendants learned for
of the plaintiffs were
Charles

H.

Chapman,

It was at this time,

the first

time

licensed contractors.

then proceeded

against the pl3intiffs at

to

file

that neit:1e'
De

a Complo1n'

the above-referenced DivisiM

, f ,- ri n t r

t

1

ors

( See Ex h i b i t
it

·tors
,., ,,,,,
c. ne

had

1 7- P ) •

become evident that

powerless to act against plaintiffs since

unlicensed and therefore had no license upon which

Division

of

Contractors could act upon,

pr2pared, through an attorney, a Complaint.
't could

bl

be served upon

plaintiffs

was

and

004).

served

An

Answer

defendants

on March

and

Contrary to

016)

in their Brief,

17,

defendants

However, before

the plaintiffs, a Complaint filed
upon

the

defendants.

complaint being filed on February 24, 1982
003

the Division

Said

(See R-001, 002,

and Counterclaim was filed by

1982

(R-001,

012,

013,

014,

015

the statement made by plaintiffs

defendants Answer

and Counterclaim is not

?remised solely on the fact that plaintiffs were unlicensed,
but primarily because of improper construction
013, 014, 015, and 106).
defendants
premised

filed

on

After the completion of discovery,

a Motion

statute.

Sec.

(R-11, 012,

for

Said

58-1-26,

Partial Summary Judgment
statutes

58A-l-l or

were

their

Utah Code

predecessor,

58-23-26 and 58-23-1.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SEC. 58A-l-26, ACTION
FOR COMPENSATION AS CONTRACTOR PROHIBITED
WITHOUT A LICENSE.
contractor

may act as

agent or

commence or

any action in any court of the state for collection
Ji

compensation

for

or

the performance of act!\ acts for which

-5-

a license is required by this

without

proving that he was a duly licensed contractor .Yhen
contract sued upon was entered into and •,yhen the a11," 1 a"
cause of action arose.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SEC. 58A-l-l LICENSE
REQUIRED FOR CONTRACTING - PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE OF CONTRACTING.
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or other
organization, or any combination of any thereof,
to engage in the business or act in the capacity
of contractor within this state without having
a license therefor as provided in this code, unless the person, firm, copartnership, corporation,
association or other organization is specifically
exempted. Evidence of the securing of any construction or building permit from a governmental
agency, or the employment of any person on a
construction project, or the offering of any
bid to do the work of a contractor as herein
defined, shall be accepted in any court of the
State of Utah as prima facie evidence of engaging
in the business or acting in the capacity of a
contractor.
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment '.Yas heHj
on November

15,

1982 before the Honorable Homer F.

Wilkinson, District Court Judge, found that questions oi
fact were raised, and denied the Motion (See R-058).
Trial proceeded on November 18, 1982 before'
jury, presided over by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinso:i.
At the close of

plaintiffs'

case, after the Court

c,j1

received testimony from plaintiffs' witnesses that ch·e,
were unlicensed at the time of the contract, construction,
and even were still unlicensed during the trial to

-6-

structures,
,, 1 i J l 1 ua

testimony was elicited that

ls employed on the cabin, which is the subject

this case, were employed by plaintiffs' and were
p 3 1d by plaintiffs.

Defendants made a Motion for Directed

Verdict, again based upon the aforementioned statutes.
At that time,
,1 nder

the Court took defendants' Motion

3dvisement and defendants proceeded with their portion

of the trial,

rebutting plaintiffs allegations and laying

the foundation
Directed

for

Verdict

their Counterclaim.
was

again

renewed

The Motion for
at

the close of

defendants case, but was still taken under advisement, and
the matter was then given to the jury.

The jury came back

in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants in the sum
·)f $7,250.00.

At this time, defendants made a Motion for

Directed Verdict and/or Motion Not Withstanding Verdict,
but was advised by the Court that this matter would be ruled
upon at a later date
On

the

(See R-58-A-8-C).

20th

day of

December,

1982,

further

was heard on defendants Motion, and a Motion for
Jirected Verdict was granted, and it is from this Motion
for Directed Verdict that plaintiffs appeal.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT EITHER
PLAINTIFF WAS A LICENSED CONTRACTOR
AUTHORIZED TO CONSTRUCT CABINS OR OTHER
STRUCTURES IN THE STATE OF UTAH, SO AS TO
JUSTIFY VACATING THE ORDER GRANTING DIRECTED
VERDICT.
The Certificate of Custodian of Records on ftlo
herein,

and dated November

that neither

plaintiff was a

the State of Utah,

total

Hubble's statement

months

1982,

state

licensed

unequivocali,

contractor ever ic'

either previously or at that time.

Certificates are a
R.

15,

previously on

in
the

impeachment of

plaintiff, Kerrc

his

taken

deposition

4th day of August,

three

1982

Ill

(Pg. 14,

Line 17 et seq.).
Further,

the

testimony of plaintiffs at tr.e

of trial, was unable to rebut the aforementioned Certi f i-3i:
of

Custodian of Records,

they were
is

an

not

licensed

unimpeachabie

in

fact

and

even

further

any other
that

state.

neither

of

admitted

tU'

Theref•He,
the

0

ploin'i,

'"•1

'he

time of contracting, construction or trial.

t ·ir

, , , ,,,,,
11"',

contractors in the State of Utah or anywhere

the 1 icense are set forth in

·>-nP. vs. "icGlynn/Garmaker Co., 567 P2d 1110
..ir,ere

tr.e Utah Supreme Court stated:

"This Court has held that the contracts of unlicensed contractors are void.
In the case of
Olsen vs. Reese, we held:
The authorities are fairly uniform to the
effect that failure to obtain a license which
is required by a statute enacted solely for
revenue purposes does not render contracts made
by the offending party void. On the other hand,
contracts made by an unlicensed contractor when
in violation of a statute passed for the protection of the public are held to be void and enforceable. Our statute is so worded as to indicate
a legislative intent to protect the citizens from
irresponsible contractors. The statute, while
not comprehensive provides for a small license
fee.
Control over the contractor is given to
the Department of Registration.
Upon an appropriate hearing, the Department may, for unprofessional conduct, suspend or cancel the
license. Good reputation and integrity are
essential to obtaining a license and the entire object of the statute is protection of
the public against fradulent and illegal
practice, which have always been recognized
as a distinct characteristic of statutes, which
are not mere revenue measures. The statute
being enacted for the protection of the public,
Plaintiff's written contract is void ••• "
In the Meridian case, an out-of-state contractor
•to held a license in another state and not Utah, was denied
ch2

ri1ht to

The

not allow a substitution of license from another

''rl
·1

recover under construction contracts.

t

0

ut

-3

h •

Neither

of

-9-

plaintiffs held

a license

anywhere.

Therefore,

plaintiffs have no basis t:> requo'

vacation of the Order granting Directed Verdict.

POINT II
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS
DID NOT ACT AS THE CONTRACTOR ON THE CABIN.
The evidence that

is before this Court

plaintiffs contracted to erect the cabin
The evidence additionally shows that

is that

(See Exhibit 5-PJ.

plaintiff, Kerry R,

Hubble, was listed as the contractor on the building permit
(See Exhibit 28-D).

There

is no question that plaintiffs

contracted the erection of said cabin for a pre-determined
amount albeit $2,500.00 as defendants contend or $3,850.00
as

the

agreement

Exhibit

5-P).

only signed by plaintiffs states

Plaintiffs did not contract

cabin for wages.

(See

to build the

Plaintiffs hired employees to perform

the construction on the cabin, and as employers, paid wages
to

the employees.

The defendants did

not pay wages and

were therefore not owner-contractors.
The
predecessor,

applicable
58-23-1,

statute,
Utah

Code

58-A-1-1,
Annotated,

establishes prima facie evidence of contracting.
that

if

the

plaintiffs

construction project
to,

both

employed

(the cabin)

in deposition

and

any

its

(19531,
It states

parson

on t',e

which they have testifi2'

(Kerry R. Hubble deposition, Pq. Jl

- 10 -

1

·n•?

t. seq.), and at trial, or the offering of any

0

c.he •.vark, which is e)(actly what plaintiffs did

1.,
"1

•..zi,[1,it

0 3 Harne Framing Package Erection Agreement"
1

5-p),

then plaintiffs are prima facie established
under the contract.

•S

(See

The Trial Court Judge

3110.ved plaintiffs to put on their case to rebut the prima
f3cie evidence that they were acting as contractors and
0s

such, were required to be licensed, particularly if they

wished

to

maintain

an

action

for

recovery of work

Even at Trial, plaintiff, Kerry R. Hubble,

performed.

admitted that he had plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge
of contracting without a license on this e)(act project,
the Chapman cabin, filed by the Summit County Attorney.
In

the discretion of
failed

the Trial Court Judge,

in their case to establish sufficient

to rebutt the presumption that they have acted
as a licensed general contractor, when in fact, they were
not.

Plaintiffs were required to be licensed, and they

POINT II I
THERE HAS BEEN NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED
TO THIS COURT TO PROVIDE ANY BASIS FOR THIS COURT
TO FIND ANY EXCEPTION TO PREVENT ENFORCEMENT OF
UTAH STATE STATUTE, PREVENTING RECOVERY FOR WORK
DONE BY UNLICENSED CONTRACTORS.
The

Legislature, at the time of the enactment

of this

law,

felt

w i thou t

s u f f i c i en t

protected from

that

cons t r u ct i ,, n

incompetent and

The method chosen
licensing

the public,

,_,,

kn o ·w l e d g

,

,,
,
1 101

s

,

unqu;i l if i ed c011 t,

1

enforcement, was that of ce,-,'-"'l

for

qualified

individuals

and companies '1nd

11

allowing those individuals and companies who are unlicenseo,
to

collect

quality.

for

their work performed,

There is no question that defendants ·were wi thoiF_

any knowledge

in the

were the exact

through

field of construction, and

type of

enacted to protect
2

4).

individuals to which this law ·11 as

(See Chapman deposition,

The

testimony

depositions and at the trial,
cabin structure was

by plaintiffs

they sold defendant,
Log

Home

Further,
Building

Framing

Therefore,
cabin,
what

themselves,
Charles

testimony at

been passed as a

i.e.

71, Lin,o

both

at :he

unequivocally show that the

(See Exhibits 9-P,

Package

Inspectors,

elicited

Pg.

not built according to the blueprints,

the sketches provided
12-P)

regardless of itc

H.

nor

10-P,

11-f', and

utilyzing materials

Chapman, as listed in the

Agreement

trial by one of

(See Exhibit
the Summit Count\

showed that said structure had ne·;er

finished

structure to allow occupanc\.

it is apparent that what occur red on the Chapmcin
shoddy and

the Legislature

improper construction, was exa:tl·,

intended to hopefully Prevent :i·1

enactment of the aforementioned statutes.
There has been one area of inroad in this do-:'_r

- 1

-

1"

lb")·;e.

There aopears to be a three pronged test
in order

1.

J1i11.

This test

for

an unlicensed contractor

is set forth

in Lignell vs. Berg,

T'1e test is as follows:

l.
Has the license inadvertently lapsed
and or was there a good faith effort made to
satisfy the licensing requirements.
2. The contracting parties knew or had
knowledge of the contractor's abilities and
thus did not rely on the competence of the contractor.
3.
The contractor supplied a performance
bond.
This

test

is shown

in

the Lignell case wherein

er.is Court stated as follows:
This Court has had frequent occasion to
comment on the status of unlicensed
contractors, and has persistently construed
the cited statute as having been designed
to protect the public and consistently to
bar recovery by unlicensed contractors for
services rendered under their contracts.
The most recent Utah cases so holding are
Mosely vs. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453
P2d 149 and Meridian Corp. vs. McGlynn/
Garmaker Company, Utah 567 P2d 1110. The
rationale of those cases is, however, that
the party from whom the contractor seeks
to recover is in the class the legislature
intended to protect. A litigant is not a
member of that class if the required protection (i.e., against inept and financially
irresponsible builders) is in fact afforded
by other means.
In Fillmore Products vs. Western States
Paving, 561 P2d 687, we adopted the point
of view expressed by Professor Corbin, viz.,
"the general rule" (of nonenforceability)
is not to be applied mechanically but in
a manner "permitting the court to consider

the merits of the pcirticulor cise ""J r
avoid unreasonable penal t: i es and f·1f 1 J,'
ures."

In this case, the denial of recover\ •,
BBC would indeed impose, unreasonable
penalties and forfeitures, particular1 1
because the Owners were never deprived of
the kind of protection the licensing statute
was designed to afford.
We consider the
following circumstances to be of cont roll in 1
significance in this regard:
1. BBC has not failed to satisfy the
licensing authority of its technical competence and financial qualification for
license.
It had inadvertently permitted
its license to lapse.
Restoration of licence
status involved no new demonstration of
qualification, but only payment of fee.

2. The Owners did not rely on any
BBC competence they inferred from BBC's
having advertised itself as a general
contractor. They had previously employed
BBC as a builder in apartment house construction. Moreover, the Owners usurped
the general contractor's prerogatives in
constructing the Terace Incline complex.
They relied on their own competence.
3.
BBC supported a performance bond
as well as labor and material suppliers
payment bond. The Owners were infinetel\
better assured of adequate and complete
performance without financial exposure
beyond the contract price than they would
have been by BBC's mere compliance with
the licensing statute.
Plaintiffs do not satisfy any of the tr,ree pnn3c
of the test.

They never had a license, the defendants

not have knowledge of the contractor's ability, and r 0
on their competence, and neither plaintiff provided
formance bond.

jiJ
1i"·1

0nl1

0ther

St"JtUteS

c·C:Jed

possible

is,

if

inroad

the

against

the

Unlicensed Contractors

contractor supervise the total construction
,_or

l·J!

'.1'CP

to Dismiss

a Complaint

and had

to Amend

not been

ruled

1emonstrate that he was

entitled

ooplicable statutes.
amend

ot the hearing,
'Le '1otion

for

failure

upon.

chance

to

in

to state

the Compalint was before

oiaintiff r,ad not had a

,ii0•>1ed

the situation

P.2d 467, Utah, 1979, the court was ruling

when a Motion

tr.e Court

This was not

In Motivated Management International

604

a '1oti0n
claim,

3

plaintiffs.

."Jt 8ar.

f'irn<"y,

•10 •

Jn

by

.ne'l

In that case the

to present the evidence to
to an

exception to

the

Plaintiff apparently was not even

its Complaint,
requested

although defense counsel,

that the court should consider

on

the

basis of

ore:::ent case,

the

court wisely did not rule on Defendants'

·-1°ti0n for

Partial Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs
"o determine

if

'Jrt,

0

in

its

''Jrfi:ient;
t, a 1
1

should be

,..

r

allowed

they were entitled

The

tne
'

the Amended Complaint.

In the

The court determined

to present their case
to be

an exception to

Plaintiffs presented their case and the

discretion,

determined

the

facts

were not

that is, met the three prong test of Lignell

tr. e

con s t r u c t i on

be e n

sup e r v i s e d by a 1 i c ens e d

1•:: t1J r •

n,e

on l}

similar fact contrary to what Plaintiffs

both cases

involved a "package home" type

- 1 ") -

and

structure,
Therefore,

that

Plaintiffs

where

is

the

are not 'lll0wed

'JI' I

c,)me under

t,)

eL'

of these exceptions.

CONCLUSION

The
plaintiffs

defendants
did

not

respectfully

provide

the

S[.;bmit

Trial

reasonably competent evidence upon which

Court

that

n, 2

with a 111

the Trial Courl

would be or would have been justified in denying Defendants'
Motion for

a Directed Verdict.

unequivocal.

The statute specifically prevents recoveq

by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs
Court that

The statutes are clear and

failed

they were entitled

to prove to the Trial

to be an exception to

statute.
It

is well within

to grant defendants'
there

is

no

discretion
Verdict.

Motion for Directed Verdict, and tr.a'"

evidence
in

the Trial Court's discretion

that

the

Trial

granting defendants'

Therefore,

the

decision

Motion
of

granting defendants' Motion should stand.

-16-

Court

the

abused it'

for

DirecteJ

Trial Court

ilEoPECTFULL'! SUBMITTED this

_L

day of August,

ANDERSON &

Defendants-

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
hand

983 '

foregoing
'ttorney
Plaza,

delivered

Brief of
for

a

true

day of August,

and correct copy of

the

Defendants-Respondents, to JOHN WALSH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Suite

202 Cove Point

3865 South Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah

84109.
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